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COMMENT
PIRACY ON THE MATRIMONIAL SEAS- THE LAW
AND THE MARITAL INTERLOPER
by Paul D. Schoonover
Primitive man married by physically capturing the female and domesticating
her to his own use.' Apparently due primarily to a scarcity of women, coupled
with the advent of semi-organized society, wife-stealing became a common phe-
nomenon.' Gradually, such practices were replaced with a form of contract, or
wife-purchase.' After much evolution the institution of marriage has become
somewhat less carnal and mercenary and has, in fact, approached divine status.4
In any event, man, in contemptuous rejection of his past, has undertaken to
punish those of his contemporaries who are given to primeval regressions and
interfere with another's marital bliss.
This Comment will explore two remedies provided by most American juris-
dictions that purport to deter those who would disrupt the sanctity of the mari-
tal relation-viz., the torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affections.
Particular emphasis will be placed upon the present status of these actions in
Texas and upon the propriety of continuing to recognize them in the future.
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTIONS
Criminal Conversation.' Among the Teutonic tribes adultery was punished se-
verely. Tacitus reported: "[TIhe punishment is instant, and inflicted by the
husband. He cuts off the hair of the guilty wife, and having assembled her re-
lations, expels her naked from his house, pursuing her with stripes through the
village." Some husbands were less kind and were allowed to kill both the lover
and the spouse if they were caught in the act. Later, the penalty was lessened
to include merely the emasculation of the adulterer plus a monetary penalty
payable to the husband. Among the Anglo-Saxons the penalty was levied
for the purpose of providing the husband with a new wife. The rise of Chris-
tianity superimposed moral reasons for discouraging adultery upon the com-
mon-law rationale, which was to insure the maintenance of pure blood lines
for inheritance purposes. The Christian morality also dictated the demise of
the custom whereby the husband obtained a new wife in the bargain, and in
its place-the damages now being "unliquidated"-the action for criminal
conversation developed.
By Blackstone's time the action was firmly entrenched.
Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public
1 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 156 (1904).
'Id. at 157.
'Id. at 179.
" "Marriages are made in Heaven." A. TENNYSON, AYLMER's FIELD line 188.
'The tort was so named since the ecclesiastical courts punished the act of adultery, or
intercourse (conversation), and it was thus a spiritual crime. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 896 n.85 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER).
'The great majority of this historical material is derived from Lippman, The Breakdown
of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 651 (1930).T TACITus, GERMANIA pt. 1, ch. 19, lines 1-4.
crime, left by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts; yet, considered as
a civil injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction
to the husband for it by action of trespass vi et armis against the adulterer,
wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary.!
The same fiction that provided a master with an action in trespass for the loss
of his servant's services also afforded the husband a similar action for the loss
of consortium-a bundle of wifely duties including sexual intercourse Thus,
for pleading purposes both the wife and servant were chattels, interference
with which constituted a direct interference with the husband-master's property
rights.
Alienation of Affections. Though the same proprietary interest of the husband
in the wife (consortium) is vindicated by the action for alienation of affections,
its derivation is distinct from that of criminal conversation. The action for the
alienation of a wife's affections evolved from the Blackstonian action for ab-
duction: "[Albduction, or taking her away, this may either be by fraud or per-
suasion, or open violence: though the law in both cases supposes force and con-
straint ... and therefore gives a remedy by writ of ravishment, or action of
trespass vi et armis, de uxore rapta et abducta."'' This action is the direct an-
cestor of Restatement section 684" and the English action for enticement or
harboring." Apparently the American action, which requires no physical sepa-
ration of the spouses," is the descendant of the action for malicious interference
8 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 139 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE]. Black-
stone had this additional comment:
But these [damages) are properly increased and diminished by circumstances;
as the rank and fortune of the plaintiff and defendant; the relation or con-
nexion between them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded on
her previous behaviour and character; and the husband's obligation by set-
tlement or otherwise to provide for those children, which he cannot but
suspect to be spurious. In this case, and upon indictments for polygamy, a
marriage in fact must be proved; though generally, in other cases, reputation
and cohabitation are sufficient evidence of marriage.Id.
9 "In its broadest meaning it [consortium) includes all incidents of the family relation-
ship. As between husband and wife the term denotes the husband's right to his wife's ser-
vices, society, companionship, assistance and sexual relations .... ." H. CLARK, THE LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 261 (1968) (hereinafter cited as
CLARK].
10 BLACKSTONE * 139 (emphasis in original).
The old law was so strict ... that if one's wife missed her way upon the
road, it was not lawful for another man to take her into his house, unless
she was benighted and in danger of being lost or drowned: but a stranger
might carry her behind him on horseback to market to a justice of the peace
for a warrant against her husband, or to the spiritual court to sue for a divorce.
Id. "This does not leave much scope for the energies of a knight-errant whose quest is the
relief of distressed wives." J. JoLOWICZ & T. LEWIS, WINFIELD ON TORT 522 (8th ed.
1967).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 684(2) (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969): "One
who, without a privilege to do so and for the purpose of disrupting the marriage relation,
causes a wife to separate from her husband or not to return after she has separated from
him, is liable to the husband for the harm thereby caused to any of his legally protected
marital interests."
"See Gottlieb v. Gleiser, 3 All E.R. 715 (Q.B. 1957).3 See, e.g., Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956). But see White v. Thom-
son, 324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E.2d 246, 247 (1949), for the Massachusetts version: "The law
does not attempt to control or limit human affections. It is only where, by alienating the
affections of one spouse, the result is adultery or the ceasing of the spouses to live together,
that the law recognizes that a tort has been committed."
COMMENT19711
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
with the marriage relationship which was recognized in New York in 1867.'4
The Effect of Married Women's Statutes. Blackstone made no mention of a
wife's right to recover for criminal conversation or alienation of affections, be-
cause no such right existed. The fiction of marital unity as reflected in the wife's
general disability to sue at common law denied her the vindication of a conju-
gal interest in her husband which, according to one theory, the common law
recognized-but declined to protect." The opposing argument viewed the wife's
disability as more than a procedural fiction--as an indication of the inferiority
of women generally in that day."
With the advent of married women's acts, servant analogies gave way to a
conception of consortium less concerned with services than with conjugal so-
ciety, comfort, and affection. The new definition of consortium was dubbed the
"sentimental version."' 7 Some courts, however, were unwilling to embrace this
development and to extend the right of action to the wife, developing imagina-
tive rationales for refusing to do so."8 One opinion,' which Prosser has deemed
"immortal,"'" expounded "at some length upon the purer and nobler nature of
wives and their tendency to stay at home and behave themselves, and the temp-
tations, enticements and allurements of the world to which the husband by
contrast was exposed, arriving at the conclusion that it was only what she had
reason to expect when she married the man.""
With respect to criminal conversation some courts attempted to show that
the common law refused to allow a wife such a right of action for substantive,
policy reasons-not just on procedural grounds." However, the opposite view
4 Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867). In Hoard the defendant-druggist
had sold plaintiff's wife large amounts of opium, knowing the effects thereof. The court
held that the resultant inability of the wife to perform her consortium duties was due to
the defendant's intentional acts and that he was liable just as if he had been a lover, enticer,
or harborer.
"5See Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472, 476
(1934); Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889). The argument is based
upon the fact that the ecclesiastical courts allowed the wife to sue for restitution of con-
jugal rights, which rights were evidently similar to "consortium." However, apparently the
only element recoverable was support. See Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Rep. 665
(Consistory Ct. 1811).
"o See Lippman, supra note 6, at 664, in which the "right without a remedy" theory of
Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889), was characterized as "not only in-
credible (because her [the wife's] very incapacity to sue was due to her inferiority), but
the Court fails to cite any case at common law from which this could be inferred."
'"Acuff v. Schmidt, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1956); Lippman, supra note
6, at 662: "Consortium, however, has taken on a new meaning. It is a term that embraces
love, affection, and company, and seems to exclude the material services of the wife which
had originally been its basis."
'See Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 A. 83 (1890); Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N.J.L. 490,
55 A. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Duffies v. Dufles, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
" Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
20 PROSSER 903.
21 Id.
21 One such court said:
[Sluch an action has grounds on which to rest that cannot be invoked in
support of a similar action in favor of the wife. A wife's infidelity may impose
upon her husband the support of another man's child, and, what is still worse,
it may throw suspicion upon the legitimacy of his own children. A husband's
infidelity can inflict no such consequences upon his wife. If she remains vir-
tuous, no suspicion can attach to the legitimacy of her children . ...
Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 A. 83, 84 (1890). See also cases cited in note 17 supra.
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prevailed, and a majority of jurisdictions allow the wife to sue both for crimi-
nal conversation and alienation of affections."
For some reason-possibly the westerner's tendency toward self-help-
there are only two Texas cases involving criminal conversation in the reports.'
Neither case involved a plaintiff-wife and, therefore, the courts have not con-
cerned themselves with theories for or against the allowance of such a suit.
However, the wife has been allowed to sue for alienation of affections."
II. THE BASES OF RELIEF
A. Criminal Conversation
Of the two Texas cases involving criminal conversation only Swearingen v.
Bray2 actually dealt with the action, since the court in Lisle v. Lynch " seemed
to treat the adultery as an element within the alienation of affections claim and
not as a separate cause of action. And since Swearingen is chiefly memorable
for its moral castigation of the defendant,2 cases from other jurisdictions will
2 5PROSSER 903-04. In Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227, 229 (1923),
the rationale for allowing the wife to sue for criminal conversation was stated thusly:
If he had feelings and honor which were hurt by such improper conduct,
who will say to-day that she has not the same, perhaps even a keener, sense
of the wrong done to her and to the home? If he considered it a defilement
of the marriage bed, why should not she view it in the same light? The state-
ment that he had a property interest in her body and a right to the personal
enjoyment of his wife are archaic, unless used in a refined sense worthy of
the times, and which gave to the wife the same interest in her husband.
See also Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959); Cahoon v. Pelton, 9
Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959).
'In Swearingen v. Bray, 157 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1913), the court
indicated that such a tendency may have accounted for the scarcity of Texas cases:
The appellant [defendant] did not testify, although he was living and present
at the trial, and the record shows that he was still living when his super-
sedeas bond was executed and filed. The fact shows that appellee had rather
be plaintiff on the civil docket, submitting his casus belli to the rules govern-
ing there, with the appellant attending the trial, than be defendant on the
criminal docket with an empty shotgun present in lieu of appellant, and betried according to the 'unwritten law.' In the light of this record his decision
speaks volumes for his forbearance. He has selected the route fraught with the
least expense and notoriety, but having a verdict for $1,500 at the end-
showing good business judgment. However, reference to the Civil Reportsof this state shows it to be a path seldom traveled by wronged husbands.
25 Lisle v. Lynch, 318 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958), error ref.
n.r.e.; Swearingen v. Bray, 157 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo, 1913).2 gTurner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1965), aa'g and revg in part 369 S.W.2d
675 (Tex. Civ. App..-Waco 1963); Whitley v. Whitley, 436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968); McQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App-San
Antonio 1950), error ref. n.r.e.; Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App-Ama-
rillo 1949); Collier v. Perry, 149 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941); error dis-missed, judgmetst correct; Kahn v. Grothaus, 104 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1937), err'or disgissed; Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1932); Jackson v. Jackson, 35 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App-El Paso 1931), error dismnissed;Nicholson v. Nicholson, 22 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Easland 1929); Smith v. Wo-
mack, 271 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925), error ref.; Burnett v. Cobb, 262
S.W. 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924).
27 157 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1913).
28 318 S.W.2d 763 (Trex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958), error ref. n.r.e.
Appellee's home, with its contentment and happiness, has been destroyed, hiswife defiled and made an outcast, his childten disgraced and scattered over
the world, and all that any husband and father holds dear and sacred is thrownat his feet reeking with filth and slime, by the shameless perfidy and lechery
of appelln an d d silence at the trial may be taken as a con-
fession of his guilt.
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be called upon to outline the law of criminal conversation in Texas as applied
in the trial courts.
The Elements of the Cause of Action. A plaintiff must prove two elements in
order to recover for criminal conversation: ( 1 ) a valid marriage between plain-
tiff and spouse; and (2) sexual intercourse between the defendant and plain-
tiff's spouse. 0 Thus, no further loss to the husband is required-the invasion of
his exclusive right to the sexual relations of his wife is sufficient." Although
Blackstone stated that an informal marriage was insufficient to support the
action,". there is more recent authority to the contrary." It is not necessary that
the defendant be aware of the marital status of the plaintiff's spouse. According-
ly it is not a defense that the plaintiff's spouse represented an unattached status
to the defendant, since one who has sexual relations with a person to whom he
is not married does so at his peril."
The plaintiff need not prove that the defendant was the originator of the
illicit relationship, nor that he was the pursuer or the seducer.' However, one
authority"' has cited a Texas case, Norris v. Stoneham,' as being contrary to this
principle. Norris was an alienation of affections case involving a problem of
causation. The defendant claimed that plaintiff's husband was the aggressor in
their relationship and that, therefore, plaintiff had failed in her case. The court
applied the common-law rule applicable to actions for criminal conversation
and held that it was no defense to the alienation action that the plaintiff's
spouse was the aggressor. The court, however, commented that "[slome of the
reasons given for applying such a rule in such actions [criminal conversation]
may not exist in actions brought by the wife .. . ."' This dicta is scant authority
We will not set out the disgusting details of the facts here, but to summarize
they show that appellant invaded the appellee's home, induced his wife to
drink with him, made her little girls bearers of his secret letters to her, fur-
nished her expense money to leave home, and followed her or went with her
to other towns, and, in short, that he dethroned the chastity of a wife, pro-
faned the sacredness of motherhood, destroyed the virtue of a home, and de-
filed the holiness of a marriage bed. He now brings his case here assigning
four errors committed by the trial court against him.
157 S.W. at 953-54.
"Sebastian v. Klutz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104 (1969); Trainor v. Deters, 22
Ohio App. 2d 135, 259 N.E.2d 131 (1969); Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125
S.E.2d 408 (1962); Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959); Schneider v.
Mistele, 39 Wis. 2d 137, 158 N.W.2d 383 (1968).
31Baldridge v. Matthews, 378 Pa. 566, 106 A.2d 809 (1954); Antonelli v. Xenakis,
363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949); Bernier v. Kochopulos, 37 Wash. 2d 305, 223 P.2d
205 (1950); Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wash. 2d 412, 213 P.2d 627 (1950).
3' See note 8 supra.
3'Hollinghausen v. Ade, 289 Mo. 362, 233 S.W. 39 (1921); Butterfield v. Ennis, 193
Mo. App. 638, 186 S.W. 1173 (1916).
4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 685, comment d at 477 (1938); Antonelli v. Xenakis,
363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949). The rule is to the contrary with respect to actions for
alienation of affections. See note 81 infra.
"3Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904); Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86 S.W.2d
293 (1935); Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 79 S.E. 872 (1913); see Seiber v. Pet-
titt, 200 Pa. 58, 49 A. 763, 765 (1901), wherein the court made the following assessment
of the defense, at least when proffered by a male defendant: "It is but the old cowardly
excuse set up by the first man, 'The woman gave me of the tree, and I did eat.' It did not
save from the penalty the first defendant, and cannot, under the law, save this one."
36 CLARK 268 n.6.
" 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932).38 Id. at 366.
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when read with Swearingen wherein an instruction in line with the general rule
was held not to be error."9 It, therefore, must be concluded that, at best, the
Texas law is not clear on this point, except in that, when the husband is plain-
tiff, he need not prove that the defendant actively seduced his wife.
It is no defense that the plaintiff and his spouse are still married or that
plaintiff has forgiven his spouse or otherwise condoned the offense." Similarly,
the fact that the spouses were separated at the time of the act will not excuse
the defendant's wrongdoing.41 The concept of a permanent marriage status, dis-
solvable only by death or divorce has dictated that the law allow damages to
be exacted from the hapless defendant who engaged in sexual relations with a
plaintiff's wife even though a divorce proceeding had been instituted and the
mandatory reconciliation conference had failed to re-unite the couple.' It is
sometimes said that love and affection between husband and wife will be pre-
sumed, especially when the marriage has produced children.' A husband may
sue even though he could never exercise his exclusive rights to his wife's sexual
relations because of impotence."
Defenses. Other than an argument that Norris v. Stoneham' recognizes as a de-
fense that the plaintiff's husband was the aggressor in the illicit relationship,"
there is but one other line of defense. If it can be shown that the plaintiff acted
in such a way with respect to his spouse's adultery as to constitute implied con-
sent or connivance of the behavior, such consent or connivance is a complete
defense to criminal conversation." In Kohlhoss v. Mobley the test for deter-
mining whether the plaintiff had consented or connived was said to be whether
his conduct "when subjected to the test of reasonable human transactions
[showed] an intention to connive, and here, as elsewhere, the presumption of
the law is in favor of honesty and correctness of purpose, but the husband, like
other persons, is chargeable with an intention to produce the necessary and le-
gitimate consequences of his own deliberate action."' The court elaborated up-
" Swearingen v. Bray, 157 S.W. 953, 954-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1913).
"Id.; Sikes v. Tippins, 85 Ga. 231, 11 S.E. 662 (1890).
4"Swearingen v. Bray, 157 S.W. 953, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1913). See also
Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949).
'See Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1949):
While the conduct of the parties may render the marriage relationship a
hollow shell, the relation, once entered into, continues until death or dis-
solution in the manner prescribed by law. Even though the parties may be
separated, as long as the contract is in existence, the state, for the good of
society and the family, clings to the possibility of a return of the relationship
to its proper state.
'See notes 85-86 infra.
"Bedan v. Turney, 99 Cal. 649, 34 P. 442 (1893). "Consortium may, but need not,
include coition which, indeed, may be entirely lacking due to injury or age at a time of
life when each party to the union needs the other more than ever." Albert v. McGrath,
278 F.2d 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
'46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932).
4 This defense would apply only when a wife is plaintiff. Id.47 Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86 S.W.2d 293 (1935); Kohlhoss v. Mobley, 102 Md.
199, 62 A. 236 (1905); Comte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1964); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 687 (1938).
48 102 Md. 199, 62 A. 236, 236-37 (1905). The court further explained: "A passive
connivance has been held to be as effectual as an active one to bar the action .... The first
general and simple rule is if a man sees what a reasonable man could not see without alarm,
if he sees what a reasonable man could not permit, he must be supposed to see and mean
the consequences." Id. at 237. Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 194, 36 A. 34, 36 (1896), put
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on this test and said that the plaintiff could still gather evidence against his
spouse by not stepping in to stop her from taking advantage of her own op-
portunities "but he must not make opportunities for her or smooth her path
to the adulterous bed."9 This defense is available when the plaintiff and spouse
had conspired against the defendant to obtain money damages." The defense
is not easily waged and is not often successful, but other than proof that the
plaintiff and spouse were not validly married at the time of the relations or
that no adulterous relations actually occurred, it is the defendant's only hope.
B. Alienation of Affections
The Elements of the Cause of Action. In Collier v. Perry it was said that "[tihe
gist of the action is the intentional and purposeful alienation of the affections
of one spouse from the other."'" A more vivid description was provided in Kahn
v. Grothaus: "The thing forbidden and made actionable is the entry of a home
by a wrongdoer and the consequent loss of consortium by the injured spouse;
and it does not matter if this entry is by physical violence or subtle influ-
ence ....
Analytically, the elements are three: (1) intentional and purposeful entice-
ment away of the affections of the spouse; (2) an actual loss of consortium;
and (3) the defendant's actions must have been the controlling cause of plain-
tiff's loss."
Intent To Alienate. While the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant
intended to alienate the affections of his spouse, such proof may be supplied by
inference." The familiar rule of tort law that one must be presumed to intend
the test yet another way: "(C)onnivance may be the passive permitting of the adultery or
other misconduct, as well as the active procuring cause of the commission. If the mind con-
sents, that is connivance."
4962 A. at 237. In Comte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1964), the jury found
connivance from facts indicating that the plaintiff took his wife to visit the defendant at
night alone in defendant's house after he knew of her profession of love for the defendant
and of sexual relations between them. See also Nadeau v. Dallaire, 132 Me. 178, 168 A.
778 (1933).
"Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 249 N.E.2d 583 (1969).
51149 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1941), error dismissed, judgment
correct.
52 104 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937), error dismissed, quoting
Hodge v. Brooks, 153 Ark. 222, 240 S.W. 2, 4 (1922).
"
3 Lisle v. Lynch, 318 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958), error ref. n.r.e.;
McQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950), error ref.
n.r.e. But in Massachusetts alienation of affections is actionable only when the result of the
alienation is adultery or the spouses cease to live together. White v. Thomson, 324 Mass.
140, 85 N.E.2d 246 (1949).
Other jurisdictions may require "malice," but in this context it means nothing more
than the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Bishop v. Glaze-
ner, 245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870 (1957); Hedman v. Siegriest, 127 Vt. 291, 248 A.2d
685 (1968). Some jurisdictions have a similar requirement of a "wrongful act." See, e.g.,
Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 265 (1969).
54 However, when the defendants are the plaintiff's "in-laws," the circumstantial evidence
may be subject to more severe scrutiny than when adultery is alleged and the presumptions
come into play. See Jackson v. Jackson, 35 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1931),
error dismissed.
An impediment to proof generally, and particularly so in these cases, is the rule of
privileged communication. Although some states do not allow the husband or wife of a
party to testify (a disqualification that could be advantageously utilized by most defendants
in alienation of affections or criminal conversation suits), Texas has no such absolute dis-
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the natural consequences of his actions applies. Thus, in Norris v. Stoneham,"
where the defendant had been living with the plaintiff's spouse-knowing him
to be married-it was held that the jury could infer intent even though the de-
fendant was shown not to have been the aggressor in the illicit relationship.
The application of this rule has led to a presumption of intent to alienate
when adultery is admitted or proven."6
While it is often stated that inaction by the defendant will not render him
liable, 7 it is evident from the decisions that inaction means just that. Any vari-
ance from absolute passivity will likely render the defendant liable.' When
there is an "inherently wrongful and seductive act"'" by the defendant, such as
adultery, the defendant cannot be deemed to have been "passive"-even though
he was not the seducer.60
Loss of Consortium. Although the action may be somewhat misnamed,6' since
consortium includes a spouse's right to the society, comfort, and assistance as
well as the affection of the other spouse," Texas courts have on occasion indi-
cated that the action arises when there is a loss of "affection or consortium.'
qualification. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3715 (1926) (emphasis added) provides:
"The husband or wife of a party to a suit or proceeding, or who is interested in the issue
to be tried, shall not be incompetent to testify therein, except as to confidential communi-
cations between such husband and wife." According to Lanham v. Lanham, 105 Tex. 91, 94,
145 S.W. 336, 338 (1912), confidential communications embrace all information coming
to a husband or wife in consequence or by reason of the existence of the marriage relation.
Confidential communications are excluded even after the relation has been dissolved by
death or otherwise. See State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. App. 1960)(income tax returns not privileged); Wallen v. Gorman, 112 Ohio App. 350, 176 N.E.2d
262 (1960) (when purpose of evidence is to show the state of feeling existing between
husband and wife prior to alienation-not privileged); Swearingen v. Vik, 51 Wash. 2d
843, 322 P.2d 876 (1958) (en banc) (privilege may be asserted by the communicating
spouse only).
"46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932).
5 McQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950), error
ref. n.r.e.; Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949); Collier
v. Perry, 149 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error dismissed, judgment
correct. See also Kiger v. Meehan, 253 Iowa 746, 113 N.W.2d 743 (1962); Pearsall v.
Colgan, 76 S.D. 241, 76 N.W.2d 620 (1956); Kuhn v. Cooper, 141 W. Va. 33, 87 S.E.2d
531 (1955). The adultery issue may go to the jury upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the adulterous spouse. Adkins v. Campbell, 234 Ore. 369, 382 P.2d 96 (1963).
'7 McQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950), error
ref. n.r.c.; Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 683, comment e (1938). See also Lewis v. Bauer, 198 N.E.2d 781
(Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
58 Except possibly when no inherently wrongful acts are involved. See notes 57, 59 supra,
and accompanying text. See also Dube v. Rochette, 262 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1970).
"McQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950),
error ref. n.r.e.
"oBut to be liable the defendant must be aware that the plaintiff's spouse was married.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 683, comment g (1938). See Comte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d
780 (Mo. 1964). The Restatement rule does not apply, however, when there has been
adultery. Madison v. Neuburger, 130 Misc. 650, 224 N.Y.S. 461 (Sup. Ct. 1927); An-
tonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949).
1 CLARK 263.
"'Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001, 1006 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949); Norris
v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932).63 McQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950),
error ref. n.r.e. Some courts have gone to great lengths to save the plaintiff from "slips of
the tonge" on the issue of loss of consortium. E.g., Edgren v. Reissner, 239 Ore. 212, 396
P.2d 564 (1964), held that plaintiff's testimony to the effect that she was not deprived of
the affections and consortium of her husband prior to their divorce was not a fatal judicial
admission, since the jury might or might not believe her, But, it should be noted, in Edgren
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Thus, Texas courts have adopted the "sentimental version"" of consortium, and,
like a majority of courts,:' have held that all the elements of consortium need
not be lost for a cause of action to accrue." In the well-known case of Ex parte
Warfield" an injunction was granted to prevent a "partial" alienation of affec-
tions. Later cases have stated that the action lies where the plaintiff has suffered
any "substantial impairment" of consortium rights." The importance of the
Texas emphasis upon the affection element becomes clear when it is seen that
proof of adultery, already shown to be sufficient from which to presume intent,"'
also gives rise to a conclusive presumption of the loss of consortium." Thus,
upon proof of criminal conversation, plaintiff has satisfied two of the three ele-
ments of his cause of action. The third element may not be so proven.
Defendant as the Controlling Cause. Causation is perhaps the most important
element in an alienation of affections case. The mere fact that the defendant
has been guilty of wrongful conduct is not sufficient to make him liable."' The
defendant's acts must have brought about the loss of affection or consortium."
In Rhodes v. Meloy it was held that the defendant's conduct need not be the
sole cause, but that "the rule that defendant must be the controlling cause of
the alienation is a sound one.""' In Lisle v. Lynch'4 "active" was added to the
"controlling cause" standard to indicate that something more than passivity is
required and that one is not liable simply because the plaintiff's spouse centers
affections upon him." The Texas rule-and the majority rule-is, at least on
the plaintiff's spouse admitted that he was trying to deceive the plaintiff into thinking their
marriage was in good order. As an exception to the hearsay rule, statements of the plain-
tiff's spouse may be testified to by witnesses or by the plaintiff himself to show the spouse's
state of mind and affections. Farrier v. Farrier, 46 Ill. App. 2d 471, 197 N.E.2d 163 (1964);
Castner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 127 N.W.2d 583 (1964); Boden v. Rogers, 249 S.W.2d
707 (Ky. 1952).
"See note 17 supra.
05 CLARK 265.
"Whitley v. Whitley, 436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1968);
Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949); Williams v. Rearick,
218 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949); Collier v. Perry, 149 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.
Civ. App.- I Paso 1941), error dismissed, judgment correct.
6740 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
6" See note 66 supra.
69 See note 56 supra.
7IMcQuarters v. Ducote, 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950), error
ref. n.r.e.; Collier v. Perry, 149 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error dis-
missed, judgment correct, following Alex v. Strickland, 111 Okla. 267, 239 P. 596 (1925).
71See note 56 supra; Swearingen v. Vik, 51 Wash. 2d 843, 322 P.2d 876 (1958) (en
banc); Bernier v. Kochopulos, 37 Wash. 305, 223 P.2d 205 (1950).
72 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 683, comment i (1938). Hearsay testimony of declara-
tions of the adulterous spouse are admissible to show the state of mind of such spouse, and
although such evidence does not prove that the defendant actually exerted a wrongful influ-
ence over the spouse, once the evidence is admitted the jury obviously considers it when
determining causation. See note 66 supra.78289 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926), error dismissed. The ra-
tionale for such a rule of causation was explained in McNelis v. Bruce, 90 Ariz. 261, 367
P.2d 625, 629 (1961) (en banc) : "There are many reasons why parties to a marriage may
separate and ultimately secure a divorce, the least of which may be the intermeddling of
a third person. Hence, we feel that the actions of a third person should be the dominating
cause for the dissolution of the union and approve the controlling cause rule."
74 318 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958), error ref. n.r.e.
75 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 683, comment e (1938). The court in Farrier v. Farrier,
46 Ill. App. 2d 471, 197 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1964), put the issue metaphorically: "Nau-
tically speaking, we must determine whether they just drifted away, whether (plaintiff's
spousel voluntarily floated them away or whether the defendant pirated them away."
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its face, less stringent than that of some other jurisdictions which require only
that the defendant's conduct be a contributing cause."6 While these standards
do not allow prediction of the outcome in any particular fact situation, in
Lisle the test was clarified somewhat by equating it to the famous "but for" test
of Place v. Searle: "The test [of liability] must be whether something has been
done which, but for the interference of the defendant would not have been
done."" Of course, the "but for" test, though more readily recognized, is in
actuality no more of a talisman than "active and controlling cause." As Clark
puts it: "Since any definitive assessment of cause in such cases would require
a full exploration of the marital history and the parties' deepest motives, the
courts must be content with a rough and ready judgment as to whether the de-
fendant was sufficiently instrumental in bringing about the marital break-up
to justify holding him responsible.""m
Defenses.
( 1 ) Qualified Privilege of Parents and Near Relatives. When parents or near
relatives are defendants they may plead their relationship to the plaintiff's
spouse as an excuse for their interference with the marital relation."' Prosser
defines "privilege" as a "*modern term applied to those considerations which
avoid liability where it might otherwise follow."" In the North Carolina case
of Bishop v. Glazener the legal effect of the family relationship was expressed:
When a suit for alienation of affections is brought by one spouse against the
parent of the other, the parent occupies a markedly different situation from a
stranger or unrelated third person in these matters. The law recognizes, respects
and protects not only the marital relation, but likewise the natural affection be-
tween parent and child. The parent does not in the eyes of the law become a
stranger by reason of the child's marriage.8'
This parental privilege is not, however, absolute. It is qualified with the proviso
that conduct which would be illegal interference by a stranger must be con-
ditioned by a proper motive when done by a parent." There is, therefore, a re-
quirement of good faith, or conversely, malice must not be the parents' moti-
"
6 Woodson v. Bailey, 210 Ala. 568, 98 So. 809 (1924); Squire v. Hill, 100 Colo. 226,
66 P.2d 822 (1937); Clark v. Orr, 127 Fla. 411, 173 So. 155 (1937); Booth v. Krouse, 78
Ohio App. 461, 65 N.E.2d 89 (1946); Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wash. 2d 412, 213 P.2d
627 (1950). The Restatement opts for "substantial factor." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
683, comment i (1938).
77 [1932) 2 K.B. 497, 521.
7 8 CLARK 266. This "rough and ready" approach was exemplified in Knight v. Willey,
120 Vt. 256, 138 A.2d 596, 599 (1958): "Just and reasonable triers of the fact might well
decide that the attentions paid to Mrs. Knight by the defendant had progressed sufficiently
far beyond the limits of propriety .... ." (Emphasis added.)7
"Jackson v. Jackson, 35 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1931), error dismissed;
Nicholson v. Nicholson, 22 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929). Apparently
professionals and semiprofessionals such as clergymen and marriage counselors may also be
clothed with a qualified privilege to interfere. See Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 536, 419 P.2d
132 (1966).
8 PROSSER 98.
8'245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1957).
82 PROSSER 901.
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vation." The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's actions
were actuated by malice."M
(2) That There Were No Affections To Alienate. This defense goes to the
second element of the cause of action; i.e., the loss of affection or consortium.
It is generally presumed that there is affection between husband and wife;
therefore, this is generally considered to be an affirmative defense." While some
jurisdictions treat the lack of affection between spouses only as a factor in miti-
gation of the damages, in effect conclusively presuming affection for purposes
of liability,"M there is Texas authority recognizing the absence of affection as a
complete defense. 7 There is, however, apparently a difference-though neces-
sarily a fine one-between a complete lack of affection between spouses and an
unhappy marriage relationship. The latter goes only to mitigate the damages.88
The rationale of those cases holding that lack of affection affects only the quan-
tum of damages is that even though the spouses are already alienated, there is
always a chance of reconciliation, and if the defendant's conduct has ended that
chance, the action still should lie.8"
83 "ITo render parents liable for such interference in the marital relations of their
children, malice upon their part must be shown to exist. There is no liability on their part
when acting in good faith and with a bona fide endeavor to serve the best interest of their
child." Nicholson v. Nicholson, 22 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929).
And see Koehler v. Koehler, 248 Iowa 144, 79 N.W.2d 791 (1956); Glatstein v. Grund,
243 Iowa 541, 51 N.W.2d 162 (1952); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 61 N.W.2d
656 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954); Wallace v. Wallace, 85 Mont. 492, 279
P. 374 (1929); Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870 (1957); Johnston v.
Johnston, 213 N.C. 255, 195 S.E. 807 (1938); Acchione v. Acchione, 376 Pa. 36, 101
A.2d 642 (1954); Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 A. 758 (1925); Carrieri v.
Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966).
"
4 Koehler v. Koehler, 248 Iowa 144, 79 N.W.2d 791 (1956); Poulos v. Poulos, 351
Mass. 708, 222 N.E.2d 887 (1967); Anderson v. Sturm, 209 Ore. 190, 303 P.2d 509(1956). The parental privilege is sometimes re-labelled a presumption of good faith. "This
of course, is a disputable presumption, and may be overcome by either direct or circum-
stantial evidence." 303 P.2d at 510. Accord, Koehler v. Koehler, 248 Iowa 144, 79 N.W.2d
791 (1956); Bradford v. Bradford, 165 Ore. 297, 107 P.2d 106 (1940).
85 Squire v. Hill, 100 Colo. 226, 66 P.2d 822 (1937); Weyer v. Vollbrecht, 208 Iowa
914, 224 N.W. 568 (1929); Trainor v. Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 259 N.E.2d 131(1969); Buckley v. Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 P.2d 188 (1931); Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash.
266, 55 P. 46 (1898). Contra, Curry v. Kline, 187 Kan. 109, 353 P.2d 508 (1960), where-
in the court said that the action was so often abused that it was necessary to require the
plaintiff to prove that he himself was not at fault in the loss of his spouse's affections nor
that she voluntarily bestowed her love upon the defendant. See also Quagliano v. Johnson,
100 Ill. App. 2d 444, 241 N.E.2d 187 (1968); Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 125
N.W.2d 38 (1963); Litchfield v. Cox, 266 N.C. 622, 146 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Warner v.
Torrance, 2 N.C. App. 384, 163 S.E.2d 90 (1968).
"Hedman v. Siegriest, 127 Vt. 291, 248 A.2d 685 (1968); Knight v. Willey, 120 Vt.
256, 138 A.2d 596 (1958). "[E]ven if there is no affection between a husband and his
wife, another person has no right to cut off all chance of its springing up in the future."
248 A.2d at 688. A somewhat weaker presumption was enunciated in Kiger v. Meehan,
253 Iowa 746, 113 N.W.2d 743 (1962), wherein it was held that the plaintiff's testimony
that there was in fact love and affection between the spouses prior to the piracy of the de-
fendant plus the presumption was enough to go to the jury with the issue. Contra, Bassett
v. Bassett, 20 II1. App. 543, 550 (1886):
Marriage, of itself, cannot be considered as conclusive proof of that mutual
regard and love which should be entertained by husband and wife, and where
one of them seeks to recover damages for the loss of love and affection,
we know of no case that goes so far as to deprive the defendant of the right
of showing the real feelings of the other to the plaintiff.
87 Rhodes v. Meloy, 289 S.W. 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926), error dismissed.8
' Id. at 162.
89 "The law indulges in the hope that notwithstanding that affection may be dead or
appears so, there is lurking in the hearts of the parties some atom left which may spring up
into returning affection and result in a reconciliation. It is against the policy of the law to
(3) That Plaintiff Was the "fActive and Controlling Cause," Not the Defen-
dant. This defense, of course, goes to the third element of the action; i.e., the
element of causation. It recognizes an alienation of the affections of plaintiff's
spouse, but argues that the plaintiff is at fault, not the defendant. This defense
is often raised when there has been a previous divorce in which the plaintiff or
his spouse was adjudged somehow to be at fault. Despite frequent arguments
to the contrary, the prior divorce proceedings are not res judicata on the issue
of fault in an action for alienation of affections." In support of this defense the
practitioner must of necessity introduce redundant evidence and testimony tend-
ing to show the pathology of the marriage break-up. The decision to emphasize
this defense may be strategically crucial, since the jury may be unable to sift
through the great amount of evidence--with the result that they may lose
sight of a stronger, but more brief defense.
(4) That Plaintiff's Spouse Originated the Alleged Illicit Relationship and
Was the Aggressor Therein. This has been recognized as a complete defense in
some jurisdictions,"' but it is doubtful that it would'be so acknowledged in Tex-
as. In Norris v. Stoneham" the defense was expressly denied where the defend-
ant argued that the plaintiff's husband actively seduced her. The court discussed
authorities dealing with criminal conversation and concluded that, at least when
adulterous conduct has been admitted or proven, other proof as to the intent of
the defendant is not necessary to plaintiff's case. It could be argued that this
defense goes to the causation element rather than the intent element, and that
Norris could be distinguished on that basis. Of course, it is likely that courts
will receive evidence as to who seduced whom on the general causation issue,
even though they do not recognize it as an independent defense.
(5) That Plaintiff's Acts Subsequent to Defendant's Alleged Wrongdoing
Constituted Connivance or Implied Consent Thereto. While condonation
always goes to the damages only," implied consent or connivance is a complete
defense to alienation of affections."
(6) Statute of Limitations. The general rule is that actions for alienation of
affections are governed by the statute of limitations pertaining to actions for
injuries to the person."5 This is the rule in Texas," and the statute specifies that
allow this possibility to be interfered with by an outsider." Jenness v. Simpson, 84 Vt. 127,
141, 78 A. 886, 893 (1911).
"Pilot v. Necastro, 50 Del. 165, 125 A.2d 857 (1956); Boden v. Rogers, 249 S.W.2d
707 (Ky. 1952); Edgren v. Reissner, 239 Ore. 212, 396 P.2d 564 (1964); Vogel v. Syl-
vester, 148 Conn. 666, 174 A.2d 122 (1961) (this case indicates, however, that some state-
ments in divorce proceedings may constitute admissions in alienation of affections or criminal
conversation actions, and that they may at least be used for impeachment purposes); Ca-
hoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959); Schneider v. Mistele, 39 Wis. 2d 137,
158 N.W.2d 383 (1968).
"Curry v. Kline, 187 Kan. 109, 353 P.2d 508 (1960); Moelleur v. Moelleur, 55 Mont.
30, 173 P. 419 (1918); Trainor v. Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 259 N.E.2d 131 (1969);
Pearsall v. Colgan, 76 S.D. 241, 76 N.W.2d 620 (1956); Archer v. Archer, 31 Tenn. App.
657, 219 S.W.2d 919 (1947); Swearingen v. Vik, 51 Wash. 2d 843, 322 P.2d 876 (1958)
(en banc).
" 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932).
"Morey v. Keller, 77 S.D. 49, 85 N.W.2d 57 (1957).
"See notes 47-50 supra, and accompanying text.
"Hosford v. Hosford, 58 Ga. App. 188, 198 S.E. 289 (1938); Rheudasil v. Clower,
197 Tenn. 27, 270 S.W.2d 345 (1954); Fischer v. Mahlke, 18 Wis. 2d 429, 118 N.W.2d
935 (1963).
"Whitley v. Whitley, 436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968).
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the action must be brought within two years from which time the cause of
action accrued.' The obvious problem is determining just when the cause of
action did accrue. The usual statement made by courts is that the statute begins
to run from the time that there is a loss of consortium." While the actual pro-
cess of alienation is gradual," it is, nevertheless, settled that alienation of affec-
tions is not a continuing wrong-but one which occurs at some certain point
in time."' Accordingly, most courts have held that the cause accrues when the
plaintiff loses the affection of the spouse, rather than the time of the defend-
ant's wrongful acts. 1' Two Texas cases, Turner v. Turner' and Whitley v.
Whitley,"' indicate that either a physical or legal separation creates a presump-
tion of loss of consortium for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Some
courts have held that the husband and wife need not have physically separated
to start the running of the statute. ' "
As a general rule the statute of limitations attaches when there is injury,
even though at the time the plaintiff may not be fully advised of the extent of
the damages suffered, and further substantial damages occur subsequently.0
It seems not far-fetched to argue that once a spouse has either personally wit-
nessed an act of adultery by the other spouse or otherwise obtained evidence of
such an act, his cause of action for alienation of affections as well as for criminal
conversation has accrued. Of particular interest is a comment of a Georgia
court: "[Blut if the act causing such subsequent damage is of itself unlawful
in the sense that it constitutes a legal injury to the plaintiff, and is thus a com-
pleted wrong, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the
time the act is committed, however slight the actual damage then may be."'10'
It is well to recall that in Smith v. Smith it was held: "Where adultery is ad-
mitted or proved, as was done in the instant case, there is authority to the effect
that loss of consortium is conclusively presumed."'07 From Smith and other
similar holdings it appears that Texas courts adhere to the view of the Tennes-
'9Tsx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).
"'Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1965), aff'g and rev'g in part 369 S.W.2d
675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963); Whitley v. Whitley, 436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968). And see Fischer v. Mahlke, 18 Wis. 2d 429, 118 N.W.2d
935 (1963).
"Palladino v. Nardi, 133 Conn. 659, 54 A.2d 265, 266 (1947); Broidioi v. Hall, 188
Tenn. 236, 218 S.W.2d 737, 738 (1949); Fischer v. Mahlke, 18 Wis. 2d 429, 118 N.W.2d
935, 938 (1963), wherein it was said: "Tlhe alienation of affections was a gradual result
of a series of wrongful acts over a substantial period of time and it may be difficult to pin-
point either the precise act causing the alienation or the time when the result was accom-
plished." In Palladino the court noted that the plaintiff may introduce evidence showing
how the alienation developed, even though such evidence preceded the date when the affec-
tions of plaintiff's spouse were completely alienated-and even though it preceded the time
beyond which the statute of limitations might prevent recovery. 54 A.2d at 266-67.
1°°Smith v. Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 492 (1918); Mullins v. Mullins,
66 Wash. 351, 119 P. 830 (1911).
"..Chenow v. Aliota, 14 Wis. 2d 352, 111 N.W.2d 141 (1961); Fischer v. Mahlke, 18
Wis. 2d 429, 118 N.W.2d 935 (1963).
102 385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1965), aff'g and revg in part 369 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1963).
1"°436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968).
0'Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying Georgia law); Hosford
v. Hosford, 58 Ga. App. 188, 198 S.E. 289 (1938); Farrow v. Roderique, 224 S.W.2d 630
(Mo. App. 1949); Morey v. Keller, 77 S.D. 49, 85 N.W.2d 57 (1957).
"'Von Dorn v. Rubin, 104 Neb. 465, 177 N.W. 653 (1920).
'"Edwards v. Monroe, 54 Ga. App. 791, 189 S.E. 419, 423 (1936).
"°7?2 $.W.d 1001, 1Q06 (Tex., Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949).
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see Supreme Court in Rheudasil v. Clower."'. In Rheudasil an action for aliena-
tion of affections was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for personal
injuries. The court said:
'Criminal conversation' means adulterous relations between the defendant and
the spouse of the plaintiff. Alienation of affections can be brought about with-
out adulterous conduct. But the contrary does not reasonably seem to be true.
That is, a spouse guilty of adulterous conduct with a third party has necessarily
lost some of his or her affection for the innocent spouse."ca
This reasoning, coupled with the Texas authority that only a "substantial im-
pairment"'10 of consortium rights is necessary to give rise to a cause of action,
supports the argument that a spouse who has evidence of the other spouse's
philandering had better use it within two years or else forfeit his right of
action."' The argument that such a holding would discourage reconciliation
of the spouses ignores the fact that the mere presence of a cause of action
may do more to destroy chances of reconciliation.
Injunctive Relief.
The attempt to dragoon the body when the need is to convince the soul will
end only in revolt."'
Although equity has traditionally protected only property rights,"' in Texas
it is settled that equitable relief is available to protect purely personal rights."'
As early as 1899 the statute giving district courts the power to issue injunc-
tions"' was interpreted to permit such relief, in spite of the historical limita-
108 197 Tenn. 38, 270 S.W.2d 345 (1954).
10 Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
"'See note 68 supra, and accompanying text.
"' The Tennessee courts have reached this conclusion by reasoning that in a cause of
action which alleges alienation of affections and is based upon an act or acts of criminal
conversation the alienation of affections count is only incidental to the charge of criminal
conversation and in aggravation of the damages. Scates v. Nailling, 196 Tenn. 508, 268
S.W.2d 561 (1954); Broidioi v. Hall, 188 Tenn. 236, 218 S.W.2d 737 (1949). If a plain-
tiff wishes to extend the period of the running of the statute of limitations, he must base his
alienation of affections count upon some wrongful act other than adultery. Nabors v. Keaton,
216 Tenn. 637, 393 S.W.2d 382 (1965) (the plaintiff alleged sexual perversion in sup-
port of the alienation of affections count). It should be noted that in Tennessee the actions
for criminal conversation and alienation of affections are governed by different statutes of
limitations. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (1955) (criminal conversation--one year); Id.
§ 28-305 (alienation of affections-three years). The confusion resulting from this situation
should not affect the conclusion that once a plaintiff learns of some actionable relationship
between his spouse and the defendant, be it adultery or perversion, the cause of action has
accrued and the limitations period, be it one, two, or three years, should begin to run. But
see Daniels v. Morris, 199 Va. 205, 98 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1957), wherein the court said:
"[A]lienation of affections is not conclusively presumed to result from acts of criminal con-
versation, but whether or not it does result is a question of fact to be determined by thejury."
"' Coolidge, The Limitations of Law, in 47 ABA REPS. 276 (1922).
' Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818). In Hanson v. Valdivia, 187 N.W.2d
151 (Wis. 1971), the fiction that consortium was a property right was avoided, and it was
held that the action for alienation of affections did not survive the death of the plaintiff
such that his estate might maintain the action.
I" Passel v. Fort Worth Ind. School Dist., 440 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1969); Hawks v.
Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924).
"15TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4642 (1952):
Judges of the district and county courts shall, in term time or vacation,
hear and determine applications for and may grant writs of injunction re-
turnable to said courts in the following cases:
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tion."' That decision, Ex parte Warfield,1  upheld the contempt conviction
of a potential alienator of affections. Warfield had been enjoined from "visit-
ing or associating with plaintiff's said wife, or going to or near her at a cer-
tain house, No. 129 Marion Street, or any other house or place, in the city
of Dallas,... where his said wife might be . . . .""' He was further prohibited
from "writing or speaking to her, or in any manner, either directly or in-
directly, communicating with her, by word, letter, writing, sign, or sym-
bol .... ""' Warfield challenged the injunction as being beyond the jurisdic-
tion of a court of equity and as violative of the first amendment. The court
of criminal appeals answered the first argument by noting that courts of
equity progress as civilization progresses and "are continually finding new
subjects for the interposition of equitable relief by . . . injunction.""1 ' As for
the first amendment argument, the court indicated that Warfield's first amend-
ment rights were not boundless, and could be circumscribed when plaintiff's
marital rights became jeopardized."2'
Twenty-four years later, in Witte v. Bauderer, an irate husband successfully
enjoined the defendant "from associating with [plaintiff's] wife, except in a
business way as employer and employee. '22 Although the court of civil ap-
peals cited no cases or other authority, it seemed to have no doubts about
the propriety of the relief. In Smith v. Womack," a suit for injunction brought
by a plaintiff-wife, the court was more concerned about the right of a wife
to bring such a suit than the wisdom or validity of equitable relief. However,
the court did take note of Snedaker v. King,' the leading authority for the
proposition that equity should not delve so far into the love lives of the
parties. But, having Warfield as precedent, the court declined to follow
Snedaker.
While the jurisdiction of Texas courts to grant injunctive relief in aliena-
tion of affections actions has been established, the propriety of granting such
relief in a particular situation is subject to a number of qualifications-or
equitable defenses."u In the court's discretion an injunction may be denied
1. Where the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief
or any part thereof requires the restraint of some act prejudicial to him.
2. Where a party does some act respecting the subject of pending litiga-
tion or threatens or is about to do some act or is procuring or suffering the
same to be done in violation of the rights of the applicant when said act
would tend to render judgment ineffectual.
3. Where the applicant shows himself entitled thereto under the principles
of equity, and the provisions of the statutes of this State relating to the grant-
ing of injunctions.
1 Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
11 Id.
'I ld. at 933.
'1 Id.20 Id. at 935.
121 Id. at 938.
112255 S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923).
12'271 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925).
"1 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924).
2 See Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Relations, 18 KY. L.J. 207, 212-19
(1930); Note, Alienation of Aflections-Bypassing the Heart Balm Acts, 38 CORNELL
L.Q. 255, 260-62 (1953).
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because of: (1) laches,"' (2) the existence of an adequate remedy at law,""7
(3) impracticality of enforcement,2 ' or (4) the likelihood that plaintiff
would not be benefited by its issuance. 2 ' Another important consideration is
that frequent issuance of injunctions in these cases might invite public ridicule
and disrespect of the courts.' At least two authorities are in disagreement
as to whether equitable intervention in alienation of affections cases is wise."'
Nevertheless, in extreme instances equitable relief should be available, and
the Texas approach, in which equitable jurisdiction is not questioned, is
preferable to the inflexibility of other jurisdictions."'
C. Damages
Although the causes of action for criminal conversation and alienation
of affections are separate and distinct wrongs, both result in the same injury-
i.e., loss of consortium." Compensation for loss of consortium is broader in
these actions than in negligence actions, and the plaintiff may recover for
mental anguish, humiliation, disgrace, loss of social position, as well as loss
of support or other direct pecuniary loss." 4 Apparently certain indirect in-
"
8 See, e.g., Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc. 85, 140 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1913), in which the
plaintiff had waited seven years after apparent complete alienation to seek the injunction.
" Hadley v. Hadley, 323 Mich. 55, 36 N.W.2d 144 (1949) (divorce held to be an
adequate remedy). In Smith v. Womack, 271 S.W. 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1925), the court pointed out that only rarely will damages be an adequate remedy: "Such
a doctrine would be tantamount to a holding that one who had a home, with carefully tilled
crops on it, ready for harvest, would have the right to sue in damages an enemy who was
seeking to destroy a dam or dyke, and thereby let the floods inundate such farm and crops
and utterly destroy them, but would not have the capacity or right to prevent such acts by
an injunction."
"28 Professor Simpson has criticized the issuance of injunctions in alienation of affections
cases as necessitating the unseemly attachment of "a probation officer permanently to the de-
fendant or inviting repeated contempt proceedings by spying or imaginative plaintiffs ...."
Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171, 221 (1936). But Pro-
fessor Moreland sees no insurmountable difficulties in allowing plaintiffs to detect violations
in these situations. Moreland, supra note 125, at 217.
.2. See, e.g., Knighton v. Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 41 So. 2d 172 (1949) (injunction
denied since the parties had separated by mutual consent and reconciliation chances were
nil); Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc. 85, 140 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (injunction denied be-
cause the plaintiff's husband had ceased living with her-the court finding no affections
left to alienate). Of course, an injunction cannot force an alienated or partially alienated
spouse to perform marital duties; it can only remove, or attempt to remove, the temptor.
See Moreland, supra note 125, at 217-18.
'aOSee Knighton v. Knighton, 252 Ala. 520, 41 So. 2d 172 (1949); Snedaker v. King,
111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924).
'21 See CLARK 267; PROSSER 880-8 1.
112 The leading cases denying jurisdiction are: Lyon v. Izen, 268 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. App.
1971); Bank v. Bank, 180 Md. 254, 23 A.2d 700 (1942); White v. Thomson, 324 Mass.
140, 85 N.E.2d 246 (1949); Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924);
Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wash. 2d 918, 226 P.2d 895 (1951). Contra, Latham v. Karger, 267
Ala. 433, 103 So. 2d 336 (1958); Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942);
Devine v. Devine, 20 N.J. Super. 522, 90 A.2d 126 (Super. Ct. 1952); Hall v. Smith, 80
Misc. 85, 140 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W.
933 (1899); Smith v. Womack, 271 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925), error
ref.; Pashko v. Pashko, 101 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
Thus, in Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104 (1969), it was held
that only one issue of compensatory damages and one issue of punitive damages should be
submitted to the jury.
11
4 Donnell v. Donnell, 220 Tenn. 169, 415 S.W.2d 127 (1967). See also Vaughn v.
Blackburn, 431 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1968); Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d
408 (1962).
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juries are also compensable." s For instance, in a Massachusetts case"" the
plaintiff argued that he was so shocked by his wife's infidelity that he no
longer trusted women and suffered from impotency. The court disallowed
recovery, but only because the plaintiff offered no expert testimony.
In McQuarters v. Ducote.'. it was held that loss of consortium is presumed
when adultery has been proved. Compensation is for the complete and con-
tinuing loss to the plaintiff, and, therefore, damages are assessed to the date
of the trial and include future suffering and disability.' Thus, the fact that
the plaintiff and his spouse are divorced does not necessarily preclude recovery
of any damages for loss or impairment of consortium occurring after divorce. '
Also, if the divorce may be properly viewed as a proximate result of the de-
fendant's acts, the divorce may enhance the damages.'
Punitive damages are allowed upon a showing that the defendant was
actuated by malice. 1 The test is whether the tort has been committed "in
such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason
or prudence would then have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plain-
tiff's rights."'" Malice may, however, be inferred from the defendant's act
if it shows a flagrant disregard for the plaintiff's rights.1" When punitive
damages are sought, evidence of the defendant's wealth is admissible.'" But
if the judge should later refuse to submit the punitive damage issue, the de-
fendant should ask that the jury be instructed to disregard such evidence.'"
Because damage awards are usually highly speculative in these cases, they
are rarely held to be excessive.'" The general rule is that the damages are
not excessive unless they "strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all
measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury
to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption."1 '7 Even
" In Eubank v. Hayden, 202 Va. 634, 119 S.E.2d 328 (1961), the plaintiff successfully
argued that the loss of money from his savings account was the proximate result of the ali-
enation of his wife's affections.
"
1 Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 249 N.E.2d 583 (1969).
137 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950), error rel. n.r.e.
"8Palladino v. Nardi, 133 Conn. 659, 54 A.2d 265 (1947); Bryant v. Carrier, 214
N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619 (1938).
"9Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 174 A.2d 122 (1961).
340 But the divorce may, under certain circumstances, mitigate the damages. See Jenness
v. Simpson, 84 Vt. 127, 78 A. 886 (1911) (allowing deduction from husband's damages
for support he was no longer obligated to provide). Contra, Lankford v. Tombari, 35
Wash. 2d 412, 213 P.2d 627 (1950).
141 Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949).
'"aFennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408, 413-14 (1962).
1Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949). Several cases
have held that when adultery is proved, malice is presumed. Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124
(N.D. 1956); Smithhisler v. Dutter, 157 Ohio St. 454, 105 N.E.2d 868 (1952); Paulson
v. Scott, 260 Wis. 141, 50 N.W.2d 376 (1951). If the plaintiff and his spouse were for-
mally separated at the time of the defendant's wrongful acts, a good argument could be
made that there was no disregard of the plaintiff's rights, and, hence, no malice. See McNelis
v. Bruce, 90 Ariz. 261, 367 P.2d 625 (1961) (en banc).
14Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956); Wiener v. Markel, 92 A.2d 706
(Del. Super. 1952); Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956); Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1
Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954). Importantly, evidence of the defendant's wealth is also
admissible if that wealth was allegedly used to effect the injury. Turner v. Turner, 385
S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1964). See also Hardy v. Raines, 228 Ark. 648, 310 S.W.2d 494 (1958).
"See Hardy v. Raines, 228 Ark. 648, 310 S.W.2d 494 (1958).
m'See Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408 (1962); Glatstein v. Grund,
243 Iowa 541, 51 N.W.2d 162 (1952).
147 Morey v. Keller, 77 S.D. 49, 85 N.W.2d 57, 60 (1957).
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though judges may often be personally aghast at the size of an award, or
personally unsympathetic toward these actions in general, such sentiment is
not a valid basis for ordering remittitur.'4 8 In addition, these damages are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.'
Factors in Mitigation of Damages. Since, inter alia, the plaintiff is supposedly
being compensated for his "hurt feelings," anything that tends to lessen his
heartbreak will mitigate the damages for criminal conversation and alienation
of affections. Thus, a showing of unhappy marital relations between plaintiff
and spouse,"' or that they were legally separated..' or otherwise living apart"'
before the defendant entered the picture, will reduce the plaintiff's damages.
Also, a reduction of damages will be proper if the plaintiff can be shown to
have erred himself,"' or to have mistreated his spouse."' The plaintiff's acts
subsequent to the commencement of the litigation may be considered by the
jury in determining the sincerity of his agony."' Any property settlement or
separation agreement may mitigate or entirely eliminate loss of support as
an element of recovery, but such agreements have no effect on the other
elements of consortium.' "
Other factors have been allowed to mitigate the plaintiff's damages even
though they have no effect upon the gravity of his injury. Instead, these con-
siderations seem somehow to reduce the defendant's blameworthiness. If the
defendant can show that the plaintiff's spouse initiated and was the seducer in
the illicit affair, plaintiff's damages are lessened." 7 Other circumstances con-
sidered in mitigation are illicit relations by the plaintiff's spouse with persons
other than the defendant,"' and the spouse's general reputation for unchasti-
"'
8 See Stoll v. Plarr, 322 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1959).
... See 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (7) (1971); Allen v. Lindeman, 164 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa
1969).
"' Comte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1964).
"'Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408 (1962).
"'Phillips v. Thomas, 70 Wash. 533, 127 P. 97 (1912).
"Cross v. Grant, 62 N.H. 675 (1882); Lewis v. Roby, 79 Vt. 487, 65 A. 524 (1907);
Kuhn v. Cooper, 141 W. Va. 33, 87 S.E.2d 531 (1955); Helminiak v. Przekurat, 184 Wis.
417, 198 N.W. 746 (1924). Kuhn points up the requirement that the plaintiff's error must
bear on the transfer of his spouse's affections to the defendant. The defendant sought to
prove that the plaintiff married her husband in violation of an earlier divorce decree, which
restrained him from remarrying for a period of sixty days. The court held that the proof
was improper for two reasons: (1) the events were too remote (sixteen years prior to
suit), and (2) the events were not relevant to the issue of the transfer of affections from
the plaintiff to the defendant.
..
4 Quagliano v. Johnson, 100 Ill. App. 2d 444, 241 N.E.2d 187 (1968). In Quagliano
the plaintiff's wife was allowed to relate acts of cruelty committed against her by the plain-
tiff apparently both in mitigation and to show a total lack of affection.
"'.Knight v. Willey, 120 Vt. 256, 138 A.2d 596 (1958).
" Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104 (1969); Donnell v. Donnell,
220 Tenn. 169, 415 S.W.2d 127 (1967). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 690, com-
ment b (1938).
"' Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Easdand 1932); Scott v.
O'Brien, 129 Ky. 1, 110 S.W. 260 (1908). See also Frierson v. McIntyre, 151 F. Supp. 5
(D. Va. 1953), wherein the court held that in the absence of any direct evidence of malice,
punitive damages may not be awarded when the plaintiff's spouse is shown to be the origi-
nator and aggressor in the illicit relationship.
"..Matusak v. Kulczewski, 295 Pa. 208, 145 A. 94 (1928); Angell v. Reynolds, 26 R.I.
160, 58 A. 625 (1904).
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ty'5 -- despite the fact that the plaintiff may have been unaware of either. "0
The fact that courts have allowed these elements to mitigate the damages indi-
cates the punitive nature of the actions and the role of the courts in dispensing
"moral justice."
III. SHOULD TEXAS CONTINUE To RECOGNIZE THESE ACTIONS?
There are some remedies worse than the disease. 6'
This year the first appellate opinion in seven years to deal with alienation of
affections actions was handed down by the Texas Supreme Court. In Kelsey-
Seybold Clinic v. Maclay"'2 the plaintiff-husband sued a medical partnership and
an individual doctor for the alienation of his wife's affections. The case was a
summary judgment appeal. The partnership had summary judgment in the
trial court, but the court of civil appeals reversed." The crucial issue was
whether the partnership owed the plaintiff any duty to take precautions to
prevent, by any use of its premises, the alienation of the affections of his wife.
The court relied on the principle in Williams v. F. & W. Grand Five, Ten &
Twenty-five Cent Stores,"" a Pennsylvania case, to charge the partnership with
such a duty. In Williams the plaintiff was accused of stealing a toothbrush, and
while being interrogated in the defendant's store, was assaulted by a guard from
an independent detective agency. Irrespective of any vicarious liability theories,
the jury was instructed that if they found that the defendant's store manager
was present at the time of the assault and did nothing to stop it, the plaintiff
could prevail. Thus, the theory of the Williams case is that one is primarily
negligent when he stands by and permits a tort to occur when he has a duty
to protect the victim.
In Maclay the court held that the partnership itself could be liable for the
alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's wife "if . . . the partnership re-
ceived information from which it knew or should have known that there might
be a need to take action,""' and it then failed to "use reasonable means at its
disposal to prevent any partner or employee from improperly using his position
with the Clinic to work a tortious invasion of legally protected family inter-
ests."'01 Although the decision is logically sound, as Justice Greenhill points
out, "' it seems to be an unwise extension of a cause of action not favored in the
law. The theory of Williams, no doubt spawned in an attempt to extend the
reach of plaintiffs further into the deep pocket of vicarious liability (albeit un-
der the name of primary negligence), comes into direct conflict with the re-
quirement that the defendant in an alienation of affections action intend to
"' Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86 S.W.2d 293 (1935); Matusak v. Kulczewski, 295
Pa. 208, 145 A. 94 (1928).
160Matusak v. Kulczewski, 295 Pa. 208, 145 A. 94 (1928); Angell v. Reynolds, 26 R.I.
160, 58 A. 625 (1904).
161 S. PUBLILIUS, MAXIM 301.
162466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971).
163456 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.) 1970).
144273 Pa. 131, 116 A. 652 (1922).
1 466 S.W.2d at 720.
16 d.
167 Id. at 720-22 (Greenhill, J., dissenting).
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alienate affections.' Mere negligence has, until now, been insufficient to sup-
port the action."'
Though Maclay will be important in other contexts for its acceptance of the
Williams theory of negligence, it also serves as a startling reminder that "heart
balm" is still very much a part of the tort law of Texas. Thirty-six years have
passed since the Legislature considered the pros and cons of the actions for
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. 7 ' Perhaps the time has come
for a reconsideration.
Heart Balm-Pluses and Minuses. On the plus side, the actions for criminal
conversation and alienation of affections are obvious attempts to (1) maintain
family solidarity by deterring wrongful interference, and (2) compensate,
however inadequately, for injuries that may often be bona fide and severe. But
the degree of success with which the actions achieve these goals may be ques-
tioned, especially in the light of the considerations on the minus side. First, the
public scandal that can be engendered by the filing of one of these actions is
an open invitation to extortion and blackmail. This problem was a major con-
sideration in the 1930's campaign to abolish the actions."' If this argument
was persuasive then, there is no reason to think it is less of a problem today.
A second objection is that by allowing juries to award compensation for
hurt feelings and thus provide "salve for the heart," damages are rendered
highly speculative.'72 It has been noted that courts will not readily grant new
trials or order remittitur in such cases.' Awards are likely to be high,74 and
although one commentator has argued that these defendants are not worthy of
too much sympathy,' the problems of proof inherent in the third objection
below seem to dictate that the uncertain and largely punitive nature of these
damages not be ignored.
The final and most important objection to the maintenance of these actions
is that the application of tort theory-with its simplistic concept of causa-
tion-just does not reflect the mechanics of the usual marriage break-up.
Psychologists have candidly admitted that they cannot say why a particular
marriage ends in divorce. 7" They speculate on the causes of extramarital sexual
activity, but the third party in the romantic triangle is not considered causally
important.' Although the law is properly concerned more with responsibility
.. See note 51 supra.
.".See Lilligren v. Win. J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 135 Minn. 60, 160 N.W. 203
(1916).
170 See HOUSE JOURNAL 1929-30 (1935). The bill to abolish criminal conversation and
alienation of affections failed by a vote of 64-56. Id. at 1930.
'.. See Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 992,
996 (1935).
171 "[W)hen it comes to measuring perverted chastity in terms of 'heart balm,' society
has not yet set up a standard as it has with peanuts and popcorn and other tangibles, by
which it can be done." Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419, 421 (1948) (en
banc).
' 
3 See notes 146-48 supra, and accompanying text.
" Although happily these actions are rare in Texas, when they are brought, awards of
$50,000 or more are probably not uncommon. See, e.g., Kuykendall v. McCann, No.
49,778-C (67th Dist. Ct., Dec. 30, 1966).
" Brown, supra note 15, at 506.
17 W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 113-14 (1956).
"71A. FROMME, THE PSYCHOLOGIST LOOKS AT SEX AND MARRIAGE 207-25 (1950).
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than with scientific causation, " it is submitted that the less correlation existing
between the two, the more likely it is that a jury finding on a causation issue
will reflect moral responsibility, rather than legal responsibility. That is, a jury,
virtually unbridled and unguided in its quest for the "controlling cause" of an
alienation of affections, will be tempted to fix responsibility upon the defendant
when his conduct has merely been "wrongful" or morally reprehensible.
Although the cases have made much of the "controlling cause" requirement as
a limitation,"' in actuality verdicts are almost never disturbed.
Since very few persons who are willing to publicly display the innermost
privacies of their married life by bringing a suit for criminal conversation or
alienation of affections could be motivated by anything other than a desire to
"get a few more bucks" out of their divorce situation, the social utility of these
actions must be doubted. In any event, the alternatives to status quo are worth
looking into.
The Legislative Choices. The choices are essentially three: ( 1 ) do nothing, and
retain the two actions as they have judically evolved; (2) engraft some statu-
tory limitations on the actions; or (3) abolish the actions.
Nine states have abolished the cause of action for criminal conversation,IS
and twelve states have abolished the action for alienation of affections.8 ' Al-
though suits for criminal conversation, like those for alienation of affections, are
subject to abusively high damages awards, the problems of proof with respect
to causation in the former are not present in the latter. This fact, coupled with
the rather lax enforcement of the adultery laws, may explain why a larger
number of states continue to recognize criminal conversation. At any rate, abo-
lition statutes are clearly constitutional in view of the state's traditional interest
in and power to regulate the incidents of the marriage contract, and since that
contract has been deemed not to be a "contract" within article one, section ten
of the United States Constitution.' If abolition is desired, the statute should
clearly indicate whether equitable relief is to survive in the absence of civil
78 W. GOODE, supra note 176, at 115.
..
9 See note 73 supra.
'ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 115 (1960); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1954); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 41-3-1 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01-.07 (1964); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 2-508 (1967); MIcH. COMP. LAWS 5 551.301 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23-1
(1952); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney Supp. 1970); WYO. STAT. ANN. 5
1-728 (1959).
181ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 115 (1960); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1954); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01-.07 (1964); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 2-508 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75C, 551-9 (1969); MIcH. COMp. LAWS 551.301
(1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 17, 5 1201 (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 41.380
(1969); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23-1 (1952); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney
Supp. 1970); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-728 (1959). Pennsylvania has abolished the action
only as against strangers and retains it "where the defendant is a parent, brother or sister
or a person formerly in loco parentis to the plaintiff's spouse." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, S
170 (1965).
18' U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 10: "No State shall . . . pass any ... Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts .... " See Ikuta v. Ikuta, 97 Cal. App. 2d 787, 218 P.2d 854 (1950);
Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461, 427 P.2d 698 (1967); Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla.
736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948) (en banc); Siegall v. Solomon, 19 Ill. 2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5
(1960); Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E.2d 619 (1937); Bean v. McFarland,
280 Mich. 19, 273 N.W. 332 (1937); Bunten v. Bunten, 15 N.J. Misc. 532, 192 A. 727
(1937); Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47 (1937).
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actions for damages. The Alabama statute has been interpreted so as not to pre-
clude the granting of injunctive relief,1" although this interpretation has been
criticized.'" Whatever the correct interpretation might be, it is clear that the
legislative intent should appear in the statute to avoid misinterpretation by
the courts.
Illinois has retained both actions, but limited the damages recoverable in
both to actual damages." The statute explicitly disallows "punitive, exemplary,
vindictive or aggravated" damages." By way of additional clarification of what
is and is not compensable, Illinois further provided:
In determining the damages to be allowed in any action for alienation of af-
fections [or criminal conversation), none of the following elements shall be
considered: the wealth or position of defendant or the defendant's prospects of
wealth or position; mental anguish suffered by plaintiff; any injury to plain-
tiff's feelings; shame, humiliation, sorrow or mortification suffered by plaintiff;
defamation or injury to the good character of plaintiff or his or her spouse...
or dishonor to plaintiff's family .... '"
Thus, it is apparent that Illinois was more concerned with the uncertainty and
punitive nature of damages, than with the danger of extortion or blackmail.
Nevertheless, by taking most of the profit out of the cause of action, "extorted"
settlements are less likely since the defendant will be more willing to "stand and
fight." Of course, the problem of causation is untouched by the Illinois ap-
proach. Still, the Illinois method indicates that statutory tampering with the
elements of common-law actions may yield an advantageous compromise so-
lution to what is, in the final analysis, a problem requiring a delicate balancing
of interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
The causes of action for criminal conversation and alienation of affections,
though originally vindicators of common-law property rights, are now cast as
protectors of the family unit. Their performance in this role has been a subject
of criticism, and must still be categorized as an issue on which reasonable men
may differ. At a time when Texas is taking a second look at a number of time-
honored concepts with regard to the family relationship in an effort to obtain
an up-to-date family code, it would be unfortunate if these two causes of action
were allowed to continue unimpaired by default. If the actions are to be re-
tained, let the decision be a conscious one, the result of at least minimal scruti-
ny. The Illinois compromise approach offers an interesting method of mini-
mizing the unsavory aspects of the actions, while at the same time keeping the
force of the law behind the integrity of the family. At least some consideration
should be given to a statutory overruling of the Maclay decision, which sets up
a realistically undefinable duty on the part of certain persons to exercise con-
trol over the activities of consenting adults. But any reconsideration of the pro-
'Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942).
..
4See Note, Alienation of Affections-Bypassing the Heart Balm Acts, 38 CORNELL
L.Q. 255, 260 (1953).
'85 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 35 (1959).
186 ld. § 36.
18 7 1d. § 37.
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priety of continuing to allow maintenance of these actions in any form should
take cognizance of the inherent limitations of the law: "Under the attempt to
perform the impossible there sets in a general disintegration .... The law ...
loses its sanctity and authority. A continuation of this condition opens the road
to chaos."'88
188 Coolidge, supra note 112, at 276.
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